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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
  hen does a cyber attack (or threat of cyber attack) give rise to a right 
of self-defense—including armed self-defense—and when should it? By 
“cyber attack” I mean the use of malicious computer code or electronic 
signals to alter, disrupt, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks 
or the information or programs on them. It is widely believed that sophisti-
cated cyber attacks could cause massive harm—whether to military capabil-
ities, economic and financial systems, or social functioning—because of 
modern reliance on system interconnectivity, though it is highly contested 
how vulnerable the United States and its allies are to such attacks.1  
                                                                                                                      
* Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Rela-
tions; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. 
1. See Mark Clayton, The New Cyber Arms Race, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 
7, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0307/The-new-cyber-arms-
race. Some experts warn of a “digital Pearl Harbor” or other likely devastating attacks on 
the United States. See, e.g., Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold War, 
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1. Other experts, however, argue that these risks 
are greatly exaggerated. See, e.g., Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 JOURNAL 
OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 5 (2012). 
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This article examines these questions through three lenses: (1) a legal 
perspective, to examine the range of reasonable interpretations of self-
defense rights as applied to cyber attacks, and the relative merits of inter-
pretations within that range; (2) a strategic perspective, to link a purported 
right of armed self-defense to long-term policy interests including security 
and stability; and (3) a political perspective, to consider the situational con-
text in which government decisionmakers will face these issues and predic-
tive judgments about the reactions to cyber crises of influential actors in 
the international system. 
My main point is that these three perspectives are interrelated, so law-
yers interested in answering these questions should incorporate the strate-
gic and political dimensions in their analysis.2 This is not just to make the 
banal, generic point that politics, strategy and law are interrelated. Of 
course they are. Rather, this article aims to show specifically how develop-
ment of politics, strategy and law will likely play out interdependently with 
respect to this particular threat—cyber attacks—and to draw some conclu-
sions about legal development in this area from that analysis. 
The focus of this essay on military self-defense to cyber attacks (that is, 
self-defense in a legal sense of resort to force) is not meant to suggest that 
this is the most important element of a comprehensive cybersecurity strat-
egy—far from it. Most attention these days is properly on other compo-
nents of that strategy, including better network security and “offensive” 
cyber measures, though military force is part of the strategic tool set. Also, 
an important caveat is that this analysis is self-consciously colored with an 
American perspective. If one assumes, as I do, though, that legal analysis 
and development cannot be divorced from strategy and politics, then 
America’s power—in its various forms—and vulnerabilities to power will 
greatly influence its own interpretive approach to these issues, and because 
of its relative power globally it will greatly influence international legal 
movement in this area.  
 
II. LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A legal perspective on the question of cyber attacks as armed attacks sees 
the issue as one of self-defense rights under the jus ad bellum framework. 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter mandates that “[a]ll Members shall refrain 
                                                                                                                      
2. This essay draws heavily on a previous article: Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks 
and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 421 (2011). 
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in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”3 Article 51 
then provides, however, that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”4 A legal question then 
arises: when, if ever, is a cyber attack an “armed attack” such that it triggers 
self-defense rights? 
No consensus answer yet exists to this question, and several analytic 
approaches are competing for adherents.5 A strict reading of “armed at-
tack” would confine its meaning to kinetic violence, as opposed to non-
physical violence or harm with no physical damage (take, for example, eco-
nomic or diplomatic sanctions), and cyber attacks might therefore be con-
sidered as unable ever—on their own—to trigger armed self-defense rights. 
This position offers a bright-line rule that is relatively easily applied, but it 
is difficult to square with the treatment of chemical or biological weapons 
attacks (which everyone would acknowledge as an armed attack) and fails 
to account for new cyber vulnerabilities. The position is therefore rarely 
advanced that a cyber attack could never constitute an armed attack. 
A more common starting point for analysis is to consider the effects or 
consequences of a cyber attack in determining whether it crosses the 
threshold of “armed attack.” That is, the essence of an “armed attack” and 
the resulting self-defense right is the direct or perhaps indirect result of a 
hostile action—typically, but not necessarily, in the form of kinetic vio-
lence—and legal interpretation should proceed by examining whether the 
results of a specific cyber attack are sufficiently like kinetic violence.6  
Among those taking an effects-based approach to Article 51 is a further 
                                                                                                                      
3. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
4. Id., art. 51. 
5. For a discussion of these positions, see Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-
Attack, 100 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 817, 841–49 (2012). 
6. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 
REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 33–34 (Wil-
liam A. Owens et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]; Michael N. Schmitt, Computer 
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thought on a Normative Framework, 37 
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 885, 914–15 (1999); Katharina Ziol-
kowksi, Computer Network Operations and the Law of Armed Conflict, 49 MILITARY LAW & THE 
LAW OF WAR REVIEW 47, 69–75 (2010); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 92–95 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013), draft availa-
ble at http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinn_manual_draft /1#share. 
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split in method. Some legal experts have suggested that to qualify as an 
armed attack a cyber attack must produce violent consequences of the sort 
usually produced by bombs or bullets.7 So, for example, a cyber attack that 
caused a power station to explode or one that caused airplanes to crash 
could legally constitute an armed attack, but cyber attacks that cause eco-
nomic or social damage—like taking down the stock market or bringing 
transportation systems to a halt—could not. Many other legal experts take 
a broader view of what sort of effects could constitute an armed attack, 
arguing that to focus on death or physical damage fails to account for 
modern society’s critical reliance on information infrastructure and connec-
tivity.8 They would, therefore, look beyond just the type of effect to its 
magnitude, immediacy and other factors in assessing whether a cyber attack 
crosses the self-defense threshold. 
Any effects-based interpretive approach leads to difficult secondary 
questions. These include how to calculate proportionality of an armed re-
sponse (especially given that the effects of cyber attacks may be difficult to 
measure and direct causality may be difficult to assess); how to judge im-
minence for the purposes of anticipatory self-defense (given that discerning 
cyber attacks from other cyber activities, like espionage, is so difficult and 
that once launched some attack sequences take place in split seconds); and 
how to consider State responsibility (given that attacks may be launched by 
individuals or groups with loose relationships to States). 
The United States government has generally followed an effects-based 
approach, though only gradually providing information publicly about the 
way in which it does or would legally assess cyber attacks’ effects. In testi-
fying before the Senate committee considering his nomination to head the 
new U.S. Cyber Command, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander explained 
that “[t]here is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use 
of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations may as-
sert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds for what con-
                                                                                                                      
7. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in COMPUTER 
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. 
O’Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
8. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 253–54 (arguing that the traditional legal empha-
sis on death or physical damage is problematic because “modern society depends on the 
existence and proper functioning of an extensive infrastructure that itself is increasingly 
controlled by information technology,” and that therefore “[a]ctions that significantly in-
terfere with the functionality of that infrastructure can reasonably be regarded as uses of 
force, whether or not they cause immediate physical damage”). 
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stitutes a use of force.”9 He went on, however, to suggest that “[i]f the 
President determines a cyber event does meet the threshold of a use of 
force/armed attack, he may determine that the activity is of such scope, 
duration, or intensity that it warrants exercising our right to self-defense 
and/or the initiation of hostilities as an appropriate response.”10 
More recently, the White House stated in its official cybersecurity strat-
egy that “[c]onsistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an in-
herent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts 
in cyberspace.”11 It went on to declare: 
 
When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyber-
space as we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess 
an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile 
acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the 
commitments we have with our military treaty partners. We reserve the 
right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international 
law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our inter-
ests.12 
 
Without expressly endorsing an effects-based legal analysis or explain-
ing the details of that analysis, the United States hereby appears to be rely-
ing on it in asserting the same self-defense authority universally recognized 
as applying to conventional armed attacks. As with any armed attack, the 
United States is declaring its view that some cyber attacks open the full 
range of self-defensive instruments; a cyber attack will not necessarily be 
met with responses confined to the cyber realm or other measures short of 
armed force.  
Offering a bit more detail as to its legal position on this, in 2011 the 
United States explained its interpretation of Article 51 to the UN Group of 
Global Experts in the following terms: 
 
                                                                                                                      
9. Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for 
Commander, United States Cyber Command: Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th 
Cong. 11 (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/ 
04%20April/Alexander%2004-15-10.pdf. 
10. Id. at 12. 
11. THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, 
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 10 (2011). 
12. Id. at 14. 
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It may be difficult to reach a definitive legal conclusion as to whether a 
disruptive activity in cyberspace constitutes an armed attack triggering the 
right to self-defence. For example, where the threat actor and the motive 
are unknown, and effects result that do not directly cause substantial 
death or physical destruction, it may be possible to reach differing con-
clusions about whether an armed attack has occurred. However, such 
ambiguities and room for disagreement do not suggest the need for a new 
legal framework specific to cyberspace. Instead, they simply reflect the 
challenges in applying the Charter framework that already exists in many 
contexts.13  
 
Nevertheless, the U.S. statement concludes that “under some circum-
stances, a disruptive activity in cyberspace could constitute an armed at-
tack.”14  
In September 2012, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh elab-
orated a little further the U.S. position in a public address, explaining that 
some cyber attacks could constitute a prohibited use of force: 
 
Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction 
would likely be viewed as a use of force. In assessing whether an event consti-
tuted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors 
including: the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action (rec-
ognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and 
location, effects and intent, among other possible issues. Commonly cited 
examples of cyber activity that would constitute a use of force include, 
for example: (1) operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) op-
erations that open a dam above a populated area causing destruction; or 
(3) operations that disable air traffic control resulting in airplane crashes.15  
 
He went on to explain the long-standing U.S. position that any such use of 
force could potentially trigger self-defense rights as an armed attack.16 
At the time of this writing, some U.S. allies have moved cautiously in 
this general direction through public statements, while some other power-
                                                                                                                      
13. See U.N. Secretary-General, Replies to the Developments in the Field of Infor-
mation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Report of the 
U.N. Secretary-General 18, U.N. Doc. A/66/152 (July 15, 2011). 
14. Id. 
15. Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command Inter-Agency Legal 
Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov 
/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm (emphasis in original).  
16. Id. 
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ful States have expressed concern about it. In 2012, for instance, the British 
Armed Forces Minister stated in response to parliamentary questioning that 
a cyber attack like that suffered by Estonia in 2007—which was widely 
blamed on Russia and which caused massive economic and social disrup-
tion—might trigger NATO’s collective self-defense provisions.17 NATO as 
a collective body has been working on a joint approach to cybersecurity, 
though NATO’s official rhetoric in the field of self-defense has been quite 
cautious.18 In 2011, the United States and Australia announced that their 
mutual defense treaty extends to cyberspace, signaling a joint intention to 
treat cyber attacks within the same cooperative framework as armed threats 
though without explicitly referencing an armed response.19 Meanwhile, 
however, in diplomatic groupings China has resisted the idea that cyber 
attacks could trigger a traditional right of self-defense, urging instead new 
forms of international legal regulation and a broader understanding of 
cyber threats, to include Internet content threatening to regime stability, 
while Russia has advocated an international agreement to fill what it sees as 
gaps in international law with respect to cyber weapons.20 
Despite calls from some circles that they urgently demand clear resolu-
tion, it is likely that legal questions about cyber attacks as armed attacks will 
be answered not through formal, multilateral instruments21—like a new 
treaty convention—but incrementally through State practice. That is, the 
law will evolve and adapt over time through the prevailing conduct and 
legal views expressed by States in planning for and responding to cyber-
attack incidents. 
                                                                                                                      
17. See UK Minister: Cyberattack Could Prompt NATO Action, GUARDIAN (May 16, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10245167.  
18. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE 
DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGAN-
IZATION ¶ 19 (2010), available at http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-
eng.pdf (discussing the need to develop joint policies on cyber defense). 
19. See Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, U.S.-
Australia Ministerial Consultations 2011 Joint Statement on Cyberspace (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/172490.htm. 
20. See Adam Segal & Matthew Waxman, Why a Cybersecurity Treaty Is a Pipe Dream, 
CNN (Oct. 26, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/ 
10/27/why-a-cybersecurity-treaty-is-a-pipe-dream/. 
21. See Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, in FUTURE CHALLENG-
ES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW 5 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), http://media 
.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Goldsmith.pdf; Segal & 
Waxman, supra note 20. 
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This means that legal evolution is likely to occur in significant part 
through defensive planning doctrine and declaratory policies issued in ad-
vance of actual cyber-attack crises, so to understand that development we 
need to rotate our analytic lens toward a strategic angle. In addition to the 
unilateral and joint self-defense policy statements cited earlier, for instance, 
Japan’s national security agencies have reportedly been following the U.S. 
lead, generally accepting the U.S. legal interpretation of Article 51 with re-
spect to cyber attacks in planning their defense.22 Given Japan’s reliance on 
U.S. security guarantees, this is not so surprising and illustrates the tight 
linkage between legal development and strategic relations.  
Legal development is also likely to occur incrementally through actions 
and reactions of States and other major international actors during and fol-
lowing actual cyber-attack crises. This means we will need to rotate our an-
alytic lens toward a political angle, too. 
 
III. A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
A strategic perspective on the question of cyber attacks as armed attacks 
sees the issue as one linking a purported right of armed self-defense to 
long-term policy interests—both national interests and global ones in the 
case of the United States—including security and stability. The substance 
and clarity of any such legal right has the potential to significantly enhance 
or detract from those strategic ends. 
Armed self-defense to cyber attacks may be strategically valuable in 
several respects. First, anticipatory or responsive military actions might be 
important in some cases to protecting military and critical infrastructure 
vulnerable to cyber attacks—for example, by striking at facilities or indi-
viduals responsible for launching or directing them—though, because the 
physical infrastructure associated with cyber attacks may be quite small and 
widely dispersed, this sort of preventive use of force specifically to neutral-
ize the possibility of initial or follow-on cyber attacks has not been the sub-
ject of much discussion. Second, the credible threat of self-defensive mili-
tary actions might help deter cyber attacks by raising the prospective costs 
of hostile cyber activities in the minds of adversaries (though probably not 
much so of non-State adversaries, against whom deterrent threats of mili-
tary action will not be very potent). Such strategic logic likely underlies the 
                                                                                                                      
22. See Govt Claims Cyberdefense Right: Says International Laws Should Be Applied to Computer 
Infilitration, DAILY YOMIURI ONLINE (May 17, 2012), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/ 
dy/national/T120516005387.htm. 
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U.S. declaratory postures described in the previous section, putting adver-
saries on notice that they should expect a possible military response to 
some cyber threats.  
This is not the place to discuss in any detail the specific challenges and 
nuances of relying in part on military defense or deterrence against cyber 
attacks, a topic that many others have written about in detail.23 The salient 
concern here is the way in which—to turn our lens back a bit and open the 
aperture to capture the legal and strategic perspectives together—legally 
regarding some cyber attacks to constitute armed attack might contribute 
strategically. It could do so in a number of ways. 
For example, if one believes that armed self-defense is important to 
protecting against cyber attacks through anticipatory or responsive military 
actions, internally a well-established legal right helps strengthen the hand of 
political leaders weighing such options (an issue taken up further in the 
next session, which turns our lens toward a political perspective). An estab-
lished or articulated right adds legitimacy to forceful options and may be 
taken as a guide of likely global reactions. A well-established right also facil-
itates military planning for such contingencies by clearing internal obstacles 
and bolstering the legitimacy and bureaucratic expectation of doing so. 
Within agencies charged with operationalizing them, it is much easier to 
plan and develop options for policy routes that are declared legal. 
By thinking externally about the expectations of others, a legal right of 
armed self-defense might contribute to deterrence by establishing and 
communicating more emphatically and clearly red lines associated with self-
defensive threats.24 It helps to signal to others thresholds beyond which 
they should expect significant escalation, to include military means. When 
combined with rules of State responsibility, a right of armed self-defense 
might also induce States to crack down more strongly on cyber attacks 
launched from their territory, or perhaps to share more intelligence about 
cyber threats within their jurisdiction, whether out of a sense of legal obli-
gation or for fear of being targeted with armed self-defense. 
                                                                                                                      
23. On the special difficulties of deterring cyber attacks, see MARTIN C. LIBICKI, 
CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR 41–52 (2009); NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 303; 
John Markoff, David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, In Digital Combat, U.S. Finds No Easy 
Deterrent, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A1. 
24. See James A. Lewis, Multilateral Agreements to Constrain Cyberconflict, ARMS CONTROL 
TODAY, June 2010, at 16; Adam Segal, Cyberspace Governance: The Next Step, Council on 
Foreign Relations Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 2 (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cyberspace-governance-next-step/p24397. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These strategic benefits, however, must be balanced with strategic risks 
associated with legal treatment of some cyber attacks as armed attacks. Cal-
ibrating among such benefits and risks has always been a purpose and sus-
taining foundation of the jus ad bellum regime, and adapting it to this do-
main will be especially tricky.25 
One strategic risk is the possibility of eroding normative constraints on 
war, shifting our focus back toward the legal perspective. As capabilities 
proliferate among State and non-State actors to conduct various sorts of 
malicious, hostile or intelligence-gathering activities in cyberspace, any de-
terrence value of treating them as armed attacks triggering self-defense 
rights under Article 51 might be outweighed by the dangers of lowering 
legal barriers to military force in a wider range of circumstances or condi-
tions. Indeed, some would argue that the strategic value of promoting a 
right of armed self-defense against cyber attacks could turn out to be quite 
low—since, among other reasons that are discussed in the following sec-
tion, it may be difficult to sufficiently prove one’s case publicly in justifying 
military responses—while doing so may introduce greater insecurity and 
instability to the international system by eroding normative constraints on 
military responses to non-military harms. 
Another strategic danger is that of miscalculated escalation: perhaps we 
want law to help stay the hand of political leaderships who might be in-
clined to overreact to cyber crisis with force. Rather than clearing the 
way—normatively and bureaucratically—for decisionmakers pressing for 
forceful responses, international law can play a role in promoting more 
thorough deliberation, even if one doubts that in extreme situations it im-
poses perfect constraints on powerful States. This again suggests the need 
to think about the strategy of cyber attacks as armed attacks while examin-
ing the issue through a political lens, too.  
 
IV. A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A political perspective considers the situational context in which political 
decision makers will face these issues and predictive judgments about the 
reactions to cyber-attack crises of influential actors in the international sys-
tem. The politics of cyber attacks will undoubtedly be shaped by law and 
                                                                                                                      
25. See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 256 (discussing costs and benefits to preventing 
escalation in setting an appropriate threshold for self-defense). 
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strategy in this area, but no effective legal or strategic doctrine can be de-
signed that does not account for the politics. 
The domestic and international politics of a future cyber crisis are, of 
course, impossible to predict accurately. A few features of such cases are 
very likely to influence those politics, however. First, cyber-attack incidents 
will probably involve a publicly ambiguous set of facts. Conventional mili-
tary attacks are usually quite visible—kinetic violence can be and often is 
broadcast widely, immediately and understandably—and the common ex-
perience of them makes political reactions fairly (though far from entirely) 
predictable. Malicious computer code or actions in cyberspace, by contrast, 
are opaque to public view, technically very complex and likely to emerge 
piecemeal.   
Second, and closely related, responses and reactions to cyber attacks 
will probably involve high levels of government secrecy. The perpetrators 
of cyber attacks may try to keep their responsibility and methods secret. 
Defenders too, though, may be reluctant to disclose details or even the very 
existence of cyber attacks, whether to protect secrets about their vulnera-
bilities and defenses, prevent public panic, avoid political embarrassment, 
or escape unwanted domestic pressure to take retaliatory actions. Consider 
the case of Stuxnet and other cyber attacks against Iran’s nuclear develop-
ment program: press accounts report that the United States and Israel 
launched these attacks covertly—trying not only to mask their responsibil-
ity but to mask the very existence of a cyber attack—while Iran officially 
denied that it had been attacked or suffered any significant harm.26  
Third, cyber-attack incidents will involve difficulties in proving attribu-
tion. It is hotly debated how effectively States can trace digital fingerprints 
of cyber attacks, which may be routed through many unwitting third par-
ties’ computer systems, back to their ultimate source, and it is widely be-
lieved that some States would conduct cyber attacks through loosely affili-
ated or unofficial private parties. As a purely technical matter, these attribu-
tion challenges may be overstated, especially for the United States and its 
premier intelligence and cyber-forensic capabilities. As a political matter, 
however, a critical issue is whether attacked States or their allies can 
demonstrate the aggressor’s culpability to domestic and international audi-
ences sufficiently to justify armed self-defense. There may be a significant 
                                                                                                                      
26. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, NEW 
YORK TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. 
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gap between sufficiently establishing attribution for internal intelligence 
purposes and doing so for external justification of forceful responses. 
A political upshot of these factors is that armed self-defense to a cyber 
attack will likely require quite a high minimum threshold of harm—
probably a much higher quantum of harm than would be required if it were 
a conventional armed attack. Political decisionmakers will have a very diffi-
cult time rallying support at home and abroad for military responses to iso-
lated cyber attacks that do not cause significant and publicly discernible 
damage, even though legal arguments might strengthen their hand in doing 
so. Whereas even low levels of hostile kinetic violence—say a barrage of 
small missiles that fail to detonate or cause much injury—will not only jus-
tify politically an armed response but may demand it politically, dud or sty-
mied cyber attacks probably will not. Swiveling back to the legal perspec-
tive, this means that although legal line-drawing near the margins is very 
challenging for lawyers applying an effects-based analysis, it may not be 
quite so problematic in practice, because States are unlikely to respond to 
small-scale attacks with military force. 
That said, it is also likely that very harmful cyber attacks for which 
armed self-defense is an option will occur against the background of or in 
combination with other hostile activities. In other words, and considering 
also the strategic perspective, there are likely to be few “naked” cases of 
cyber attacks—bolt-from-the-blue actions in the complete absence of other 
significant hostile actions or threats—against which political leaders will 
consider armed self-defense a viable response. States launching cyber at-
tacks will likely be doing so in combination with other strategic acts, in-
cluding militarily threatening moves. Non-State groups such as terrorist 
organizations against which military self-defense might make any sense will 
generally have already threatened other violence. Regardless of how such 
non-cyber moves and threats figure formally into a defending State’s legal 
analysis, as a political matter they will no doubt figure significantly in its 
public justification of force. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING FORWARD 
  
As the issue of cyber attacks as armed attacks is examined simultane-
ously through the three lenses—the legal, strategic and political—several 
general conclusions emerge. First, there is a range of reasonable interpreta-
tions of cyber “armed attacks” for the purposes of triggering militarily 
forceful self-defense, and a stable consensus is unlikely for the foreseeable 
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future. One reason for this legal instability is that strategic asymmetries pull 
interpretation in different directions.27 I previously stated it this way:  
 
The United States appears to be placing its legal bets on a future world in 
which it can continue to rely partly on its comparative military edge to de-
ter cyber-attacks while supplementing that deterrence with its own offen-
sive, defensive, and preemptive cyber-capabilities—a bet that plays to 
some advantages but also carries risks. Reaching legal consensus with 
other major powers on these issues will be difficult in part because they 
perceive a different combination of strategic risks and opportunities. 
Therefore, U.S. policymakers should prepare to operate in a highly con-
tested and uncertain international legal environment.28 
 
The legal positions between States—and even within States—may shift 
over time as offensive advantages and defensive vulnerabilities shift. More-
over, international law regulating force changes very slowly, while the in-
formation technology creating these strategic opportunities and risks will 
continue to evolve rapidly.  
Second, incremental legal development through State practice will be 
especially difficult to assess because of several features of cyber attacks. 
Actions and counteractions with respect to cyber attacks will lack the 
transparency of most other forms of conflict, sometimes for technical rea-
sons but sometimes for political and strategic reasons. It will be difficult to 
develop consensus understandings even of the fact patterns on which 
States’ legal claims and counterclaims are based, assuming those claims are 
leveled publicly at all, when so many of the key facts will be contested, se-
cret, or difficult to observe or measure. Furthermore, the likely infrequency 
of “naked” cases of cyber attacks—outside the context of other threats or 
ongoing hostilities—means that there will be few opportunities to develop 
and assess State practice and reactions to them in ways that establish widely 
applicable precedent.  
Finally, law can and should be used to support strategy in calibrating 
appropriate triggers and thresholds for self-defense, though the political 
features of cyber-attack crises—many of them directly linked to the tech-
nical features of cyber attacks—make doing so in advance more difficult 
than it has been with respect to conventional military threats. This means 
                                                                                                                      
27. On some of these asymmetries, see Thomas Rid, Think Again: Cyberwar, FOREIGN 
POLICY, Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 58. 
28. Waxman, supra note 2, at 448–49. 
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that the adaptation of international law and the development among allies 
and partners of strategy to combat cyber threats go hand in hand. Those 
taking a more formalistic method to self-defense law may view this ap-
proach to legal interpretation as too malleable and subordinating of law to 
power politics. But any legal approach that fails to account for the strategic 
and political dynamics of cyber attacks is unlikely to survive early encoun-
ters with those realities.  
 
 
 
